This rule is not contained in F.R.E. or U.R.E. It does restate and codify the existing Delaware law. This rule restates existing Delaware case law. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is merely a rule of circumstantial evidence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, Del. Supr., 71 A.2d 69 (1950); Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Del. Supr., 192 A.2d 910 (1963); Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., Del. Super., 290 A.2d 4 (1972). The doctrine does not give rise to a presumption, but is only an inference of negligence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, supra; Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co., Del. Supr., 239 A.2d 703 (1968); Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., Del. Super., 154 A.2d 565, 567 (1959). The pleading of specific acts of negligence does not preclude reliance on the doctrine. Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., supra; Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., supra. Before the doctrine will apply, 5 elements must be present:
(1) The circumstances must show that the accident would not ordinarily have occurred if those who had management and control of the instrumentality had used proper care. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, supra; Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., supra; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., Del. Super., 220 A.2d 217, 220 (1966); Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., supra;
Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., supra; Dillon v. GMC, Del. Super., 315 A.2d 732 (1974), aff’d, Del. Supr., 367 A.2d 1020 (1976); Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., Del. Super., 202 A.2d 131 (1964). Expert testimony may be required to show the degree of care required. Hornbeck v. Homeopathic Hosp., Del. Super., 197 A.2d 461, 463 (1964).
(2) The instrumentality causing the accident must have been under the control of defendant. Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., supra; Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., supra; Slovin v. Gauger, Del. Super., 193 A.2d 452 (1963). Exclusive control is not required, however. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, supra; Phillips v. Delaware Power & Light Co., supra; Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Del. Supr., 172 A.2d 252, 259 (1961); Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., supra.
(3) The doctrine applies only where direct evidence of negligence is absent and unavailable. Vattilana v. George & Lynch, Inc., supra; Slovin v. Gauger, supra; Dillon v. GMC, supra; Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co., supra; Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra.
(4) The accident must not be the fault of plaintiff. Dillon v. GMC, supra; Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., supra; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra.
(5) There must be a causal connection between defendant’s act or omission and the accident. Vattilana v. George & Lynch, supra; Skipper v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., supra; Wilson v. Derrickson, Del. Supr., 175 A.2d 400 (1961); Ciociola v. Delaware Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra; Dillon v. GMC, supra. The applicability of the doctrine should be determined at the close of plaintiff’s evidence. Delaware Coach Co. v. Reynolds, supra; Dillon v. GMC, supra. The jury or judge may find against the plaintiff even though the doctrine is present. Hornbeck v. Homeopathic Hosp., supra; Scott v. Diamond State Tel. Co., supra. The law of the place where the injury occurred determines whether res ipsa loquitur will be applied. Hopkins v. Chesapeake Utils. Corp., supra. The doctrine has also been applied in Williams v. General Baking Co., Del. Super., 98 A.2d 779 (1953); Dickens v. Horn & Hardart Baking Co., Del. Super., 209 A.2d 169 (1965). See also 6 Schwartz, Trial of Accident Cases, §§ 6169, 6171, 6173.
This comment is based on Schwartz, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Delaware, 4 Del. Law Forum 3 (1978). D.R.E. 304 was amended in 2017 in response to the 2011 restyling of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The amendment is intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in ruling on evidence admissibility.