Definition of “Firm” [1] Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this definition can depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0(c). For purposes of this rule, the term “firm” includes lawyers in a private firm and lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation, legal services organization, or other organization, but does not include a government agency or other government entity. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to confidential information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the Rule that information acquired by one lawyer is attributed to another. [2] There is ordinarily no question that the members of the law department of an organization constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. [3] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid organizations. Lawyers employed in the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular Rule that is involved, and on the specific facts of the situation. Principles of Imputed Disqualification [4] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph
(a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the Rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph
(a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by paragraph
(b) or (c). [5] Where an individual lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, paragraph
(j) of that Rule, and not this Rule, governs whether that prohibition applies also to other lawyers in a firm with which that lawyer is associated. For issues involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. [6] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11. Exception for Personal Interest of the Disqualified Lawyer [7] The rule in paragraph
(a) does not prohibit representation by the firm where neither questions of client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where an individual lawyer could not effectively represent a given client because of an interest described in Rule 1.7(b)(4), but that lawyer will do no work on the matter and the disqualifying interest of the lawyer will not adversely affect the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified. For example, a lawyer’s strong political beliefs may disqualify the lawyer from representing a client, but the firm should not be disqualified if the lawyer’s beliefs will not adversely affect the representation by others in the firm. Similarly, representation of a client by the firm would not be precluded merely because the client’s adversary is a person with whom one of the firm’s lawyers has longstanding personal or social ties or is represented by a lawyer in another firm who is closely related to one of the firm’s lawyers. See Rule 1.7, Comment [12] and Rule 1.8(h), Comment [7], respectively. Nor would representation by the firm be precluded merely because one of its lawyers is seeking possible employment with an opponent ( e.g. , U.S. Attorney’s Office) or with a law firm representing the opponent of a firm client. Lawyers Moving Between Firms [8] When lawyers move between firms or when lawyers have been associated in a firm but then end their association, the fiction that the law firm is the same as a single lawyer is no longer wholly realistic. There are several competing considerations. First, the client previously represented must be reasonably assured that the principle of loyalty to the client is not compromised. Second, the rule of disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude other persons from having reasonable choice of legal counsel. Third, the rule of disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after having left a previous association, or unreasonably hamper the former firm from representing a client with interests adverse to those of a former client who was represented by a lawyer who has terminated an association with the firm. In this connection, it should be recognized that today many lawyers practice in firms, that many to some degree limit their practice to one field or another, and that many move from one association to another several times in their careers. If the concept of imputed disqualification were defined with unqualified rigor, the result would be radical curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another and of the opportunity of clients to change counsel. [9] Reconciliation of these competing principles in the past has been attempted under two rubrics. One approach has been to seek per se rules of disqualification. For example, it has been held that a partner in a law firm is conclusively presumed to have access to all confidences concerning all clients of the firm. Under this analysis, if a lawyer has been a partner in one law firm and then becomes a partner in another law firm, there is a presumption that all confidences known by a partner in the first firm are known to all partners in the second firm. This presumption might properly be applied in some circumstances, especially where the client has been extensively represented, but may be unrealistic where the client was represented only for limited purposes. Furthermore, such a rigid rule exaggerates the difference between a partner and an associate in modern law firms. [10] The other rubric formerly used for dealing with vicarious disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Applying this rubric presents two problems. First, the appearance of impropriety can be taken to include any new client lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by the former client. Second, since “impropriety” is undefined, the term “appearance of impropriety” is question-begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of imputed disqualification cannot be properly resolved either by simple analogy to a lawyer practicing alone or by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety. [11] A rule based on a functional analysis is more appropriate for determining the question of vicarious disqualification. Two functions are involved: preserving confidentiality and avoiding positions adverse to a client. Confidentiality [12] Preserving confidentiality is a question of access to information. Access to information, in turn, is essentially a question of fact in particular circumstances, aided by inferences, deductions, or working presumptions that reasonably may be made about the way in which lawyers work together. A lawyer may have general access to files of all clients of a law firm and may regularly participate in discussions of their affairs; it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to all information about all the firm’s clients. In contrast, another lawyer may have access to the files of only a limited number of clients and participate in discussion of the affairs of no other clients; in the absence of information to the contrary, it should be inferred that such a lawyer in fact is privy to information about the clients actually served but not those of other clients. [13] Application of paragraphs
(b) and
(c) depends on a situation’s particular facts. In any such inquiry, the burden of proof should rest upon the firm whose disqualification is sought. [14] The provisions of paragraphs
(b) and
(c) which refer to possession of protected information operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of information relating to a particular client of the firm, and that lawyer later joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is disqualified from representing another client in the same or a substantially related matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict. [15] Independent of the question of disqualification of a firm, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rule 1.6. Adverse Positions [16] The second aspect of loyalty to a client is the lawyer’s obligation to decline subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former client arising in the same or substantially related matters. This obligation requires abstention from adverse representations by the individual lawyer involved, and may also entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed disqualification. Hence, this aspect of the problem is governed by the principles of Rule 1.9. Thus, under paragraph (b), if a lawyer left one firm for another, the new affiliation would preclude the lawyer’s new firm from continuing to represent clients with interests materially adverse to those of the lawyer’s former clients in the same or substantially related matters. In this respect paragraph
(b) is at odds with – and thus must be understood to reject – the dicta expressed in the “second” hypothetical in the second paragraph of footnote 5 of Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A.2d 37, 42 n. 5 (D.C. 1984) (en banc), premised on LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 257-59 (7th Cir. 1983). An exception to paragraph
(b) is provided by subparagraph (b)(3). [17] The concept of “former client” as used in paragraph
(b) extends only to actual representation of the client by the newly affiliated lawyer while that lawyer was employed by the former firm. Thus, not all of the clients of the former firm during the newly affiliated lawyer’s practice there are necessarily deemed former clients of the newly affiliated lawyer. Only those clients with whom the newly affiliated lawyer in fact personally had a lawyer client relationship are former clients within the terms of paragraph (b). [18] Subparagraph (b)
(2) limits the imputation rule in certain limited circumstances. Those circumstances involve situations in which any secrets or confidences obtained were received before the lawyer had become a member of the Bar, but during a time when such person was providing assistance to another lawyer. The typical situation is that of the part time or summer law clerk, or so called summer associate. Other types of assistance to a lawyer, such as working as a paralegal or legal assistant, could also fall within the scope of this sentence. The limitation on the imputation rule is similar to the provision dealing with judicial law clerks under Rule 1.11(b). Not applying the imputation rule reflects a policy choice that imputation in such circumstances could unduly impair the mobility of persons employed in such nonlawyer positions once they become members of the Bar. The personal disqualification of the former non-lawyer is not affected, and the lawyer who previously held the non-legal job may not be involved in any representation with respect to which the firm would have been disqualified but for subparagraph (b)(2). Rule 1.6
(h) provides that the former nonlawyer is subject to the requirements of Rule 1.6 (regarding protection of client confidences and secrets) just as if the person had been a member of the Bar when employed in the prior position. [19] Under certain circumstances, paragraph
(c) permits a law firm to represent a person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. The firm, however, may not represent a person in a matter adverse to a current client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not represent the person where the matter is the same as, or substantially related to, that in which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has material information protected by Rule 1.6. [20] Subparagraph (b)
(3) removes the imputation otherwise required by paragraphs 1.10
(a) and (b), but does so without requiring informed consent by the former client of the lawyer changing firms. Instead, it requires that the procedures set out in subparagraphs (b)(3)(A) and (B) be followed. The term “screened” is defined in Rule 1.0
(l) and explained in comments [4]-[6] to Rule 1.0. Lawyers should be aware, however, that even where subparagraph 1.10(b)
(3) has been followed, tribunals in other jurisdictions may consider additional factors in ruling upon motions to disqualify lawyers from pending litigation. Establishing a screen under this rule does not constitute dropping an existing client in favor of another client. Cf. D.C. Legal Ethics Op. 272
(1997) (permitting lawyer to drop occasional client for whom lawyer is handling no current projects in order to accept conflicting representation). [21] Subparagraph (b)(3)(A) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter from which the screened lawyer is disqualified. See D.C. Legal Ethics Op. 279 (1998). [22] The written notice required by subparagraph (b)(3)(B) generally should include a description of the screened lawyer’s prior representation and an undertaking by the new law firm to respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former client regarding the screening procedures. The notice should be provided as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent. It also should include a statement by the screened lawyer and the new firm that the screened lawyer’s former client’s confidential information has not been disclosed or used in violation of the Rules. The notice is intended to enable the screened lawyer’s former client to evaluate and comment upon the effectiveness of the screening procedures. Nothing in this rule is intended to restrict the firm and the screened lawyer’s former client from agreeing to different screening procedures but those set out herein are sufficient to comply with the rule. [23] Paragraph
(f) makes it clear that a lawyer’s duty, under Rule 1.6, to maintain client confidences and secrets may preclude the submission of any notice required by subparagraph (b)(3)(B). If a client requests in writing that the fact and subject matter of the representation not be disclosed, the screened lawyer and law firm must comply with that request. If a client makes such a request, the lawyer must abide by the client’s wishes until such time as the fact and subject matter of the representation become public through some other means, such as a public filing. Filing a pleading that is publicly available or making an appearance in a proceeding before a tribunal that is open to the public constitutes a public filing for purposes of this rule. Once information concerning the representation is public, the notifications called for must be made promptly, and the lawyers involved may not honor a client’s request not to make the notifications. [24] Although paragraph
(f) prohibits the lawyer from disclosing the fact and subject matter of the representation when the client has requested in writing that the information be kept confidential, the paragraph requires the screened lawyer and the screened lawyer’s new firm to prepare the documents described in paragraph
(f) as soon as the representation commences, to file the documents with Disciplinary Counsel, and to preserve the documents for possible submission to the screened lawyer’s former client if and when the client does consent to their submission or the information becomes public. [25] The responsibilities of partners, managers, and supervisory lawyers prescribed by Rules 5.1 and 5.3 apply in respect of screening arrangements under Rule 1.10(b)(3). Lawyers Assisting the Office of the Attorney General of the District of Columbia [26] The Office of the Attorney General of the District of Columbia may experience periods of peak need for legal services which cannot be met by normal hiring programs, or may experience problems in dealing with a large backlog of matters requiring legal services. In such circumstances, the public interest is served by permitting private firms to provide the services of lawyers affiliated with such private firms on a temporary basis to assist the Office of the Attorney General. Such arrangements do not fit within the classical pattern of situations involving the general imputation rule of paragraph (a). Provided that safeguards are in place which preclude the improper disclosure of client confidences or secrets, and the improper use of one client’s confidences or secrets on behalf of another client, the public interest benefits of such arrangements justify an exception to the general imputation rule, just as Comment [1] excludes from the definition of “firm” lawyers employed by a government agency or other government entity. Lawyers assigned to assist the Office of the Attorney General pursuant to such temporary programs are, by virtue of paragraph (e), treated as if they were employed as government employees and as if their affiliation with the private firm did not exist during the period of temporary service with the Office of the Attorney General. See Rule 1.11
(h) with respect to the procedures to be followed by lawyers participating in such temporary programs and by the firms with which such lawyers are affiliated after the participating lawyers have ended their participation in such temporary programs. [27] The term “made available to assist the Office of the Attorney General in providing legal services” in paragraph
(e) contemplates the temporary cessation of practice with the firm during the period legal services are being made available to the Office of the Attorney General, so that during that period the lawyer’s activities which involve the practice of law are devoted fully to assisting the Office of the Attorney General. [28] Rule 1.10
(e) prohibits a lawyer who is assisting the Office of the Attorney General from representing that office in any matter in which the lawyer’s firm represents an adversary. Rule 1.10
(e) does not, however, by its terms, prohibit lawyers assisting the Office of the Attorney General from participating in every matter in which the Attorney General is taking a position adverse to that of a current client of the firm with which the participating lawyer was affiliated prior to joining the program of assistance to the Office of the Attorney General. Such an unequivocal prohibition would be overly broad, difficult to administer in practice, and inconsistent with the purposes of Rule 1.10(e). [29] The absence of such a per se prohibition in Rule 1.10
(e) does not diminish the importance of a thoughtful and restrained approach to defining those matters in which it is appropriate for a participating lawyer to be involved. An appearance of impropriety in programs of this kind can undermine the public’s acceptance of the program and embarrass the Office of the Attorney General, the participating lawyer, that lawyer’s law firm and clients of that firm. For example, it would not be appropriate for a participant lawyer to engage in a representation adverse to a party who is known to be a major client of the participating lawyer’s firm, even though the subject matter of the representation of the Office of the Attorney General bears no substantial relationship to any representation of that party by the participating lawyer’s firm. Similarly, it would be inappropriate for a participating lawyer to be involved in a representation adverse to a party that the participating lawyer has been personally involved in representing while at the firm, even if the client is not a major client of the firm. The appropriate test is that of conservative good judgment; if any reasonable doubts concerning the unrestrained vigor of the participating lawyer’s representation on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General might be created, the lawyer should advise the appropriate officials of the Office of the Attorney General and decline to participate. Similarly, if participation on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General might reasonably give rise to a concern on the part of a participating lawyer’s firm or a client of the firm that its secrets or confidences (as defined by Rule 1.6) might be compromised, participation should be declined. It is not anticipated that situations suggesting the appropriateness of a refusal to participate will occur so frequently as to significantly impair the usefulness of the program of participation by lawyers from private firms. [30] The primary responsibility for identifying situations in which representation by the participating lawyer might raise reasonable doubts as to the lawyer’s zealous representation on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General must rest on the participating lawyer, who will generally be privy to nonpublic information bearing on the appropriateness of the lawyer’s participation in a matter on behalf of the Office of the Attorney General. Recognizing that many representations by law firms are nonpublic matters, the existence and nature of which may not be disclosed consistent with Rule 1.6, it is not anticipated that law firms from which participating lawyers have been drawn would be asked to perform formal “conflicts checks” with respect to matters in which participating lawyers may be involved. However, consultations between participating lawyers and their law firms to identify potential areas of concern, provided that such consultations honor the requirements of Rule 1.6, are appropriate to protect the interests of all involved – the Office of the Attorney General, the participating lawyer, that lawyer’s law firm and any clients whose interests are potentially implicated. This site uses essential cookies that include tracking technologies to assist with navigation and your ability to provide feedback, analyze your use of our products and services, assist with our promotional and marketing efforts, and provide content from third parties. View Privacy Policy Accept
