Rule 381 Original Actions in the Supreme Court Pursuant to Article VI, Section 4(a), of the Constitution

(Revised January 5, 1981) Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) Prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1970, the original-jurisdiction rule necessarily was concerned with the only original-jurisdiction cases authorized by the Constitution of 1870, which were limited to actions relating to revenue, mandamus, prohibition and habeas corpus. The new constitution vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in other classes of cases in which factual issues might arise. Rule 381 would be inappropriate for such cases. Paragraph (a) has, therefore, been modified to limit Rule 381 to the traditional original actions to which it has previously applied, which are now covered by article VI, section 4(a), of the 1970 Constitution. A new Rule 382 provides for cases arising by virtue of the new mandatory exclusive original jurisdiction vested in the Supreme Court by articles IV and V of the 1970 Constitution. The procedure in original actions was unchanged in substance by this rule, as adopted effective January 1, 1967, though it is spelled out in more detail than it was in former Rule 46, which governed until that date. Effective January 1, 1964, the paragraph of the former rule requiring original proceedings relating to the revenue to be brought at least 20 days before the first day of the term, unless the cause is continued, was deleted as unnecessary. Matters relating to the closing of the issues, the briefing schedule, and the holding of an oral argument are left to the discretion of the Supreme Court. Paragraph (a) was amended in 1981 to add the penultimate sentence, requiring that when the motion is filed when the court is not in session, a copy shall be sent to each of the justices at his district chambers. See the committee comments to Rule 361(c). Paragraph (d) Paragraph (d) was added to Rule 381 in May, 1969, to protect the judge whose action is being reviewed from becoming personally involved as a party in litigation in which his role is solely judicial. The amendment makes it unnecessary for the judge to choose between the alternatives of retaining counsel of his own or being represented by counsel for the successful party. “A judge will thus be guarded from engaging in ex parte discussions with counsel or aligning himself even temporarily with one side in pending litigation.” Rapp v. Van Densen (3d Cir. 1965), 350 F.2d 806, 813. See also General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins (4th Cir. 1966), 363 F.2d 87, 89. See also Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.