Rule 24 Trial Jurors

Rule Text

Amendment history: Amended October 30, 1992, effective January 19, 1993; amended October 26, 2000, effective March 1, 2001; amended December 19, 2003, effective March 1, 2004. Compare. — Rule 24, Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Open voir dire in capital murder case constitutional. — The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital murder case by requiring an open voir dire with the entire venire panel present. Such an open voir dire, rather than a sequestered examination, did not create a “presumption of guilt” in the minds of the potential jury members, and thus did not deny the constitutional right of a fair and impartial jury. Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 4708 (U.S. 1984). General discussion of constitutional aspects of peremptory challenges. — See Evans v. State, 653 P.2d 308, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 399 (Wyo. 1982). Constitutional for state to use peremptory challenge to remove death-inhibited jurors. — The defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated by the state using its peremptory challenge to remove death-inhibited jurors from the jury panel. Engberg v. State, 686 P.2d 541, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 301 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077, 105 S. Ct. 577, 83 L. Ed. 2d 516, 1984 U.S. LEXIS 4708 (U.S. 1984). Purpose of voir dire examination is to raise alleged bias “from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact.” It is designed to explore the possible grounds for challenges for cause under state statutes. Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976). The purpose of voir dire is to inquire of the jurors as to their prejudices and biases which would interfere with their ability to decide the case fairly. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982). In determining bounds of voir dire examination, deference is afforded to the judgment of the trial court. The burden is upon the party who challenges the ruling of the trial court to establish abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Summers v. State, 725 P.2d 1033, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 614 (Wyo. 1986). Voir dire to be conducted under supervision of trial judge. — Voir dire is to be conducted under the supervision and control of the trial judge, in whose judgment deference is given in determining the permissible bounds. Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982). Obligation of defendant on voir dire. — It is the obligation of the defendant to examine jurors on voir dire and discover by proper investigation facts affecting their qualifications, and then to seasonably raise that objection with respect to any member of the panel. Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976). Latitude which should be allowed counsel when interrogating prospective jurors is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gerard v. State, 511 P.2d 99, 1973 Wyo. LEXIS 166 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1072, 94 S. Ct. 585, 38 L. Ed. 2d 478, 1973 U.S. LEXIS 1655 (U.S. 1973); Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2000), overruled, Patterson v. State, 2025 WY 30, 565 P.3d 692, 2025 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2025). Latitude allowed counsel during voir dire is within sound discretion of trial court. Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2000), overruled, Patterson v. State, 2025 WY 30, 565 P.3d 692, 2025 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2025). No improper argument during voir dire. — In defendant’s indecent liberties case, defendant was not denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire where, although the trial court might have been more aggressive in managing the voir dire process, it did allow considerable latitude to both sides. The limitations placed on voir dire by the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure are flexible, and purposely so, so as to allow the trial court discretion in that important process. Person v. State, 2004 WY 149, 100 P.3d 1270, 2004 Wyo. LEXIS 190 (Wyo. 2004). Form of questioning. — Form of prosecutor’s questions during voir dire did not improperly precondition jurors to a particular result. Metzger v. State, 4 P.3d 901, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2000), reh’g denied, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 141 (Wyo. June 12, 2000). No improper argument during voir dire. — Although there was a fine line between arguing facts of case and exploring possible prejudices among venire, trial court did not abuse its discretion in latitude it gave counsel during voir dire. Beartusk v. State, 6 P.3d 138, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2000), overruled, Patterson v. State, 2025 WY 30, 565 P.3d 692, 2025 Wyo. LEXIS 31 (Wyo. 2025). Waiver of ground for bias or prejudice. — A failure to directly and plainly examine jurors with respect to a particular basis for bias or prejudice, which later is developed, constitutes a waiver of that ground. Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976). To show prejudice defendant is required to show that he was denied his right to a peremptory challenge because he was forced to exercise it against an unqualified juror. Parks v. State, 600 P.2d 1053, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 461 (Wyo. 1979). Fact that juror has been the victim of a crime not disclosed on voir dire does not require a conclusion of bias or partiality as a matter of law. Lopez v. State, 544 P.2d 855, 1976 Wyo. LEXIS 159 (Wyo. 1976). Court may ascertain whether jurors can act only on evidence presented. — The defendant-appellant failed to establish that the trial court could not have reasonably concluded other than his questions on voir dire were proper and were directed only to ascertain whether or not the prospective jurors could act only on the evidence presented in court, or that the trial court acted beyond the bounds of reason in its attempt to explain to the prospective jurors that which was necessary to them to give a fair and impartial consideration to the case. He did not establish the violation of a clear or unequivocal rule of law and, hence, did not establish plain error. Gresham v. State, 708 P.2d 49, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 593 (Wyo. 1985). Judge did not place undue pressure on jury requiring a mistrial when during voir dire, he told the jurors that they would have at least from Thursday night through the following Monday to deliberate (not to “make a decision”) on sexual assault charges against defendant. Valdez v. State, 727 P.2d 277, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 632 (Wyo. 1986). Function of alternate jurors. — Alternate jurors are selected so that a trial can continue even if one of the jurors is unable to continue serving for any reason. Parks v. State, 600 P.2d 1053, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 461 (Wyo. 1979). Prejudice from seating of alternate juror not shown. — The defendant does not show he was prejudiced by the seating of the alternate juror where he does not contend that the alternate juror did not listen to the evidence that was presented, that the alternate juror was unqualified to serve, or that the results of the case would have been different had the original juror not been originally seated. Parks v. State, 600 P.2d 1053, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 461 (Wyo. 1979). “Verdict” for purposes of alternate-juror selection. — Reading Wyo. R. Crim. P. 2 and 24(e) together, and in light of the purpose served by alternate jurors, it seems clear that the term “verdict” in Wyo. R. Crim. P. 24(e) must be read in a broad sense to refer to a final jury decision on any matter specifically committed to it. Thus, the term must be read to refer not only to a determination of a defendant’s guilt of a crime, but also to a jury’s separate determination of a matter of the sort typically involved in bifurcated proceedings, such as a defendant’s habitual-criminal status or the propriety of the death penalty. Pursuant to such a view, a capital-case jury may be said to retire to consider its verdict twice, once for the guilt phase and once for the sentencing phase, and alternate jurors are authorized to serve in sentencing-phase deliberations even if they did not serve during the guilt phase, so long as the replacement is made before the jury retires to begin sentencing-phase deliberations. Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2003). Timing of selection of alternate and replacement jurors. — In order to obtain the most attentive panel of jurors, it is prudent to delay the selection of alternates until all of the evidence has been heard. In the capital case at hand, the trial court did not inhibit the defendant’s ability to use his peremptory challenges in accordance with Wyo. R. Crim. P. 24, when the trial court selected the alternate jurors just prior to deliberation on the guilt phase of the trial. Moreover, the trial court properly determined that Wyo. R. Crim. P. 24 allowed the trial court to select the replacement juror when an alternate juror was needed, and not before, where the replacement juror sitting on the panel for the sentencing phase was, in fact, the first juror selected from the clerk’s drum when the trial court found it necessary to use one of the alternate jurors. Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, 67 P.3d 536, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 57 (Wyo. 2003). Substitution of alternate juror was error. — The substitution of an alternate juror, after jury deliberations had begun in a defendant’s kidnapping trial, constituted prejudicial error, where (1) the reconstituted jury was not instructed to recommence deliberations from the beginning; (2) there was no inquiry as to whether the remaining regular jurors could set aside their previous deliberations and any opinions formed during those deliberations; and (3) the potential for prejudice was evidenced by the fact that the original jury deliberated the previous afternoon without reaching a verdict, but managed to reach a verdict with the participation of the alternate juror in less than an hour. Alcalde v. State, 2003 WY 99, 74 P.3d 1253, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 2003). Failure to discharge alternate juror when deliberations commenced. — Where an alternate juror was mistakenly allowed into the jury room and remained there for the first hour and a half of deliberations, it was presumed that the juror participated; since the trial court did not instruct the jurors to disregard that juror’s input, the reviewing court could only further presume that defendant was prejudiced. McAdams v. State, 2003 WY 104, 75 P.3d 665, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 125 (Wyo. 2003). Peremptory challenges proper. — In an attempted first-degree murder case, defendant’s equal protection rights under Batson were not violated by the prosecutor’s exercise of two peremptory challenges against Hispanic jurors because one of the Hispanic jurors knew one of the law enforcement witnesses, knew another witness’s mother, and preferred not to miss an upcoming doctor’s appointment. The other Hispanic juror knew a witness. Mattern v. State, 2007 WY 24, 151 P.3d 1116, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 27 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1153, 127 S. Ct. 3021, 168 L. Ed. 2d 741, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 8451 (U.S. 2007).