Rule 35 Correction or Reduction of Sentence

(a) Correction. — The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Additionally the court may correct, reduce, or modify a sentence within the time and in the manner provided herein for the reduction of sentence.

(b) Reduction. — A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the court may reduce a sentence without motion, within one year after the sentence is imposed or probation is revoked, or within one year after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within one year after entry of any order or judgment of the Wyoming Supreme Court denying review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or probation revocation. The court shall determine the motion within a reasonable time. Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision. The court may determine the motion with or without a hearing. Compare. — Rule 35, Fed. Rules Cr. Proc. Denial of motion proper. — District court did not err when it denied defendant’s motion for sentence modification or reduction because the court indicated that it had considered the motion and the file in the matter and that it was otherwise well advised on the premises and defendant made no argument that the district court relied on improper evidence or that he had no opportunity to respond to the state’s arguments. Burke v. State, 2024 WY 33, 545 P.3d 440, 2024 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2024). Motion for modification improperly granted. — Where defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault under a plea agreement that expressly waived his right to file any sentence modification or adjustment motion, and the district court warned that any such motion would be deemed void on its face, the district court erred in granting defendant’s subsequent motion for sentence modification based on post-sentencing developments like mental health difficulties and good behavior while incarcerated. State v. Boni, 2026 WY 57, 589 P.3d 1271, 2026 Wyo. LEXIS 65 (Wyo. 2026). Applicability. — Alleged error asserted by defendant, that the trial court used a victim’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial under a hearsay exception, was not a claim of illegal sentence which could be addressed by a motion under this rule. Cardenas v. State, 925 P.2d 239, 1996 Wyo. LEXIS 151 (Wyo. 1996). While a 365-day sentence was clearly illegal as the maximum for defendant’s third driving under the influence conviction was six months under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(e), the sentence could be corrected pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35. Crosby v. State, 2011 WY 44, 247 P.3d 876, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 2011). Proceedings prior to sentencing. — Where defendant did not claim the sentence was illegal, only that his understanding of the sentence was imperfect, otherwise he would not have entered his guilty plea, his true issue was not with the sentence but with proceedings prior to the imposition of that sentence, and proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence are beyond the scope of this rule. Duran v. State, 949 P.2d 885, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 158 (Wyo. 1997). Double jeopardy claim improperly brought. — A motion to vacate or correct sentence brought under subdivision (a) is not the proper remedy by which to assert a violation of double jeopardy protections — the proper remedy is through a petition for post-conviction as provided in § 7-14-101 to § 7-14- 108. DeSpain v. State, 865 P.2d 584, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 185 (Wyo. 1993), abrogated as stated in Tucker v. State, 2015 WY 65, 349 P.3d 987, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2015). Double jeopardy claims are not cognizable and can not be entertained upon a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pursuant to this rule. Birr v. State, 895 P.2d 43, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 67 (Wyo. 1995). Fixing a new date for execution following a stay was not a “sentence” within the meaning of this rule or § 7-13-905, which provides that the date of execution “shall not be less than thirty (30) days after the date of the sentence.” Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 542 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S. Ct. 582, 88 L. Ed. 2d 564, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4837 (U.S. 1985). Written judgment and sentence does not control over an oral sentence at variance with it. Where the transcript of the oral sentence and judgment and the mittimus are unambiguous and plain in directing a consecutive, not concurrent, sentence, and the written judgment and sentence contains an oversight and omission in this respect, it may be properly corrected by the trial court in a nunc pro tunc judgment and sentence. Lane v. State, 663 P.2d 175, 1983 Wyo. LEXIS 318 (Wyo. 1983). Where defendant was properly convicted but sentenced under wrong statute, case was remanded for resentencing pursuant to this rule. Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 322 (Wyo. 1984). Separate crimes in separate cases. — When an individual is convicted for separate crimes in separate cases, the sentencing judge has discretion to determine whether the sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently and there is no presumption of a concurrent sentencing. Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1995). Validity of conviction will not be addressed under this rule. — A motion to correct an illegal sentence presupposes a valid conviction and may not be used to re-examine errors occurring at trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence; therefore, issues concerning the validity of a conviction will not be addressed in the context of a Rule 35 motion. Evans v. State, 892 P.2d 796, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 1995). And case remanded where sentence of incarceration and restitution unlawful. — Where a sentence of incarceration and restitution was unlawful under former law, and the sentence may have been treated differently if the trial court had known that it could not impose restitution when the defendant was sentenced to incarceration, the case was remanded for resentencing. Bishop v. State, 687 P.2d 242, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 310 (Wyo. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 998 (U.S. 1985). Discretion of court. — A motion to correct an illegal sentence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, but if the sentence is, in fact, illegal, that discretion is limited. White v. State, 934 P.2d 745, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 53 (Wyo. 1997). Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for correction of illegal sentence; court could not abuse its discretion since defendant failed to present it with any claim of illegality in his sentence. Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2000). District court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction. The district court declined to reduce defendant’s sentence after giving due consideration to that motion in light of the facts of the case, not because it believed it was precluded from doing so by a plea agreement. Bonney v. State, 2011 WY 51, 248 P.3d 637, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 54 (Wyo. 2011). District court properly denied defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction because, although the district court cited the time limits in its order denying defendant’s motion, there was no indication the court denied defendant’s motion on the basis it found the motion was not timely filed, and defendant did not allege any other error in the district court’s ruling. Alford v. State, 2017 WY 105, 401 P.3d 902, 2017 Wyo. LEXIS 108 (Wyo. 2017). District court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for sentence reduction because the district court’s statements regarding the purpose of a motion for sentence reduction and that a sentencing judge was in the best position to decide the motion were not an indication the district court was declining to rule on his motion, there was no unreasonable delay in the district court’s ruling, and the district court considered his progress while incarcerated as requested. Buckingham v. State, 2023 WY 92, 535 P.3d 887, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2023). Motion after appeal held timely. — Since defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence was filed within one year of the order dismissing his appeal of the order revoking his probation, the district court had jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion for sentence reduction. Tomlin v. State, 2001 WY 121, 35 P.3d 1255, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 147 (Wyo. 2001). Reduction of sentence denied. — District court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for sentence reduction because the supreme court was not convinced that he did not have a prior felony conviction for fourth-degree domestic assault based on the records from the sentencing court; and defendant failed to show that the district court actually relied upon the State’s alleged misrepresentation of his criminal history when denying his motion for sentence reduction. Bulisco v. State, 2023 WY 38, 527 P.3d 1265, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 38 (Wyo. 2023). Review of sentencing hearing. — A close review of the sentencing proceeding demonstrated that there was no impropriety during the sentencing hearing. Ayers v. State, 949 P.2d 469, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 165 (Wyo. 1997). Defendant’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were not violated when the district court denied his motion for sentence reduction under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(b) because defendant failed to establish bias on the part of the district court. Leners v. State, 2022 WY 127, 518 P.3d 686, 2022 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2022). Sentence not illegal. — Execution of appellant’s sentence was, in essence, conditionally stayed pending appellant’s admission to the alcohol treatment center, and he was granted a furlough for that purpose under this section of the statute; however, because appellant willfully refused to conform his behavior to the expectations of the treatment program, he was transferred to the Wyoming Department of Corrections — a condition that was made clear to him at the time of his sentence. While the supreme court did not approve of the departure from the many sentencing alternatives that were available to the district court, appellant’s sentence was not illegal under this section of the rule. Center v. State, 2011 WY 73, 252 P.3d 963, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 180 (Wyo. 2010). Sentencing court’s failure to state whether defendant’s life sentences were to be served concurrently with or consecutively to defendant’s parole revocation sentence did not render the sentences illegal because it was presumed the sentences were consecutive. Bird v. State, 2015 WY 108, 356 P.3d 264, 2015 Wyo. LEXIS 123 (Wyo. 2015). Illegal sentence was corrected on appeal where it was in the interest of judicial economy to do so. Kahlsdorf v. State, 823 P.2d 1184, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 202 (Wyo. 1991). Claim of illegal sentence considered by appellate court, although not raised below. — Although the defendant failed to move the sentencing court for correction of the “illegal sentence,” and although a motion to correct an illegal sentence is normally for the trial court in the first instance, in the interest of judicial economy, the appellate court considered the defendant’s claim, that his sentence was illegal. Price v. State, 716 P.2d 324, 1986 Wyo. LEXIS 508 (Wyo. 1986) (plurality opinion) . Although defendant did not timely appeal his sentence or request its correction, its legality could be considered for the first time on appeal. Endris v. State, 2010 WY 73, 233 P.3d 578, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 76 (Wyo. 2010). Failure to request a correction of sentence pursuant to subdivision (a) did not bar the supreme court from hearing the appeal because appeal was from judgment and sentence. Leger v. State, 855 P.2d 359, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 117 (Wyo. 1993). Motion for correction or reduction of sentence. — A motion to correct an illegal sentence under subsection (a) is addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Similarly, a motion for reduction of sentence is subject to the sound discretion of the sentencing court. Sweets v. State, 2001 WY 126, 36 P.3d 1130, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2001). Because an expectation was not a promise or commitment, the district court’s written expression of its expectation that defendant’s sentence would be reduced did not require the court to reduce his sentence after he completed the Youthful Offender Transition Program; the district court did not limit its later discretion or otherwise guarantee defendant that his sentence would be reduced, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for a sentence reduction. Gosselin v. State, 2025 WY 79, 572 P.3d 498, 2025 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 2025). Motion timely filed. — District court erred in ruling that defendant’s motion for sentence reduction was untimely because he filed his motion for sentence reduction within two months of the appellate court’s mandate affirming his conviction, but because the district court ruled on the merits of the motion rather than dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction, the error was harmless. Buckingham v. State, 2023 WY 92, 535 P.3d 887, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 94 (Wyo. 2023). Application of “deemed denied” rule. — Appellate court assumed jurisdiction over an appeal of denial of postconviction relief although the district court declined to rule on the motion for over a year; the appeals court acknowledged that this rule provides for application of civil procedure rules where there is no rule of criminal procedure on point, but declined to apply the “deemed denied rule” of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2). Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, 108 P.3d 838, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2005). Reduction of sentence within power of district court. — Where a second sentence imposed, “not less than three years nor more than seven years,” was, in effect, a reduction from that imposed from the bench previously, “not less than five years nor more than seven, with three years suspended from top time,” since defendant was then eligible for parole in three years rather than four, such a reduction was clearly within the power of the district court. Montez v. State, 573 P.2d 34, 1977 Wyo. LEXIS 306 (Wyo. 1977). Judgment and sentences which failed to award credit for presentence incarceration time were illegal and correction was permitted by a motion under subdivision (a). Parker v. State, 882 P.2d 1225, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1994). There was no abuse of discretion by trial court in denying motion to reduce defendant’s sentence based merely upon prisoner’s commendable conduct while incarcerated. Carrillo v. State, 895 P.2d 463, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 79 (Wyo. 1995). Motion for reduction of sentence is addressed to sound discretion of trial court, and the court’s decision is accorded considerable deference. Peper v. State, 776 P.2d 761, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 169 (Wyo. 1989). Motion barred by res judicata. — When appellant entered his guilty pleas in 2006, he did not challenge the imposition of consecutive sentencing on direct appeal; he did not raise the issue until his 2009 motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Because he failed to show good cause why the issue was not raised earlier, it was barred by res judicata. Cooper v. State, 2010 WY 22, 225 P.3d 1070, 2010 Wyo. LEXIS 24 (Wyo. 2010). A trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to modify a defendant’s sentence, and the supreme court will not disturb its determination absent an abuse of discretion. Barela v. State, 936 P.2d 66, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1997). Language of subdivision (b) of this rule is clearly discretionary. Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2000). Res judicata would bar consideration of defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence because he failed to present his claim on presentence confinement earlier. Cruzen v. State, 2023 WY 5, 523 P.3d 301, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2023). And decision not disturbed absent abused discretion. — The district court has broad discretion in determining whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence, and the Supreme Court will not disturb its determination absent an abuse of discretion. McFarlane v. State, 781 P.2d 931, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 220 (Wyo. 1989). The decision to reduce a sentence, pursuant to a motion filed in accordance with this rule, lies in the broad discretion of the trial court, and the Supreme Court will not disturb its decision absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Asch v. State, 784 P.2d 235, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 256 (Wyo. 1989). Appellate court could not review defendant’s claim that the judgment and sentence entered after he pleaded guilty were illegal due to the fact that he was not advised that his guilty pleas could result in the disqualification of his right to possess firearms pursuant to federal law because he raised it for the first time on appeal; moreover, even if the claim had been raised before the district court, it would have been barred by res judicata because the claim could have been raised on direct appeal and in defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief. Ridgerunner, LLC v. Meisinger, 2013 WY 31, 297 P.3d 121, 2013 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2013). Consecutive life sentences for prior and contemporaneous convictions not unconstitutional. — Defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence was properly denied where the existence of a prior conviction and the existence of a contemporaneous conviction rested on the same quality of evidence and neither sort of evidence was required to be determined by a jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard; the trial court did not err by imposing consecutive life sentences on defendant. Blakeman v. State, 2005 WY 13, 105 P.3d 472, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 2005). Articulation of reason. — Trial court was not required to articulate a “just cause” for denying defendant’s motion for reduction of sentence. Hodgins v. State, 1 P.3d 1259, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 75 (Wyo. 2000). District court entitled to deference. — A district court’s resolution of a motion to correct or reduce a sentence is entitled to considerable deference. Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1981). And Supreme Court will not substitute its views. — On appeal of a motion to correct or reduce a sentence, the Supreme Court will not substitute its views for those of the district court unless there is no rational basis for the district court’s conclusions. Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1981). But will accept trier’s findings supported by evidence. — On appeal of a motion to correct or reduce a sentence, the Supreme Court must accept the trier’s finding of facts, as long as they are supported by substantial evidence from which a reasonable inference may be drawn. Fortin v. State, 622 P.2d 418, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 276 (Wyo. 1981). Only sentencing alternatives which may be considered on a motion for sentence reduction are those which would have been proper at the original sentencing. Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1984). Presentence confinement. — Presentence confinement is defined as incarceration for inability and failure to post bond on the offense for which the sentence is entered and does not include revoked probation or other confinement that would continue to exist without regard for bond posting capabilities. Sweets v. State, 2001 WY 126, 36 P.3d 1130, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2001). Defendant’s incarceration on a prior conviction was not presentence confinement and he was not entitled to presentence credit for his confinement on that conviction when he was subsequently convicted and sentenced on a new charge of delivering a controlled substance. Sweets v. State, 2001 WY 126, 36 P.3d 1130, 2001 Wyo. LEXIS 157 (Wyo. 2001). Motion for correction of a sentence under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(a) to allow for 216 days of presentence incarceration was denied because defendant had already been given all the credit he was entitled to; some of the credit had been used in a prior drug case, and defendant was not entitled to credit for confinement that occurred prior to the offense date. Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, 150 P.3d 179, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 6 (Wyo. 2007). Maximum sentence modified for presentence confinement. — Where the defendant was sentenced to a term of not less than seven nor more than 10 years, but the record demonstrates that he was entitled to a credit against his maximum sentence for pre-sentence confinement of 85 days because of his indigency, because the maximum term would have exceeded that authorized by the legislature, and because his retention in custody for purposes of a competency examination did not justify the denial of the credit, the case was remanded to the district court with the direction that the defendant’s sentence be modified to encompass a credit of 85 days for pre-sentence confinement against the maximum 10- year sentence. Lightly v. State, 739 P.2d 1232, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 475 (Wyo. 1987). Failure to credit presentence incarceration abuse of discretion. — Where the original sentence failed to credit the defendant with presentence incarceration time against his minimum term, it was an illegal sentence, and the refusal of the trial court to correct the illegal sentence was an abuse of discretion. Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1990). Presentence confinement taken into account by prison. — The executive department of government can, and should, award credit for presentence confinements, which simply should be taken into account by the authorities at the penitentiary or prison when determining release dates. It would seem that only in the few instances in which there is some real dispute about the credit that it would be necessary to insist that the convicted person return to the court for obvious relief. Ramirez v. State, 800 P.2d 503, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 131 (Wyo. 1990). Credit for presentence confinement. — There was no error in the decision of the court to deny credit for presentence confinement where the record was clear that defendant was not confined solely because of his inability to post the bond for the offense of which he was convicted. Rosalez v. State, 955 P.2d 899, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 46 (Wyo. 1998). Credit for confinement in community corrections facility. — Appellant inmate was improperly denied credit for the time spent at a community corrections facility (CCF) after a violation of probation because time in a CCF constituted official detention under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-108(a) and a person in a CCF could be charged with escape under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-18-112. Baker v. State, 2011 WY 53, 248 P.3d 640, 2011 Wyo. LEXIS 55 (Wyo. 2011). District court properly did not give defendant credit for the 107 days spent at a Michigan probation residential center because although that program provided services similar to Wyoming’s Adult Community Corrections program (ACC), it was not approved or overseen as an ACC program under Wyoming law, therefore, defendant was not in official detention while at the Michigan program and could not be charged with escape for leaving the facility, unlike if he had been placed in a Wyoming ACC program. Durkin v. State, 2024 WY 101, 556 P.3d 221, 2024 Wyo. LEXIS 103 (Wyo. 2024). Trial court lacks jurisdiction to reduce previously imposed sentence beneath legislatively-mandated minimum term. — Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233, 1984 Wyo. LEXIS 352 (Wyo. 1984). Jurisdiction to consider motion. — Court had jurisdiction to consider a motion for reduction of sentence where the circumstances that supposedly divested the court of jurisdiction were beyond defendant’s control; he timely filed his motion for reduction, and there was no indication of an improper purpose for the delay. Patrick v. State, 2005 WY 32, 108 P.3d 838, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 2005). District court lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s challenge to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13- 402(b) in a motion to correct his sentence because the rule did not provide him an avenue for relief; the constitutionality of § 7-13-402(b) did not pertain to the validity of defendant’s sentence because it was an argument directed at the Board of Parole’s administration of his sentence. Sides v. State, 2021 WY 42, 483 P.3d 128, 2021 Wyo. LEXIS 49 (Wyo. 2021). Court may reduce sentence of incarceration to probation after defendant has served only two and one-half months of his sentence of five to eight years for aggravated burglary. State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 473 (Wyo. 1987). Reimposition of sentence after probation revoked. — It is within the district court’s discretion to consider a motion for sentence reduction filed 120 days (now one year) from the imposition of sentence, which includes the reimposition of sentence following a probation revocation. Nelson v. State, 733 P.2d 1034, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1987). District judge had no jurisdiction to reduce death sentence, supported by sufficient evidence, to life imprisonment under this rule, because to have done so would have been in direct conflict with the legislative mandate of § 6-2-102 (presentence hearing for murder). Hopkinson v. State, 704 P.2d 1323, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 542 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026, 106 S. Ct. 582, 88 L. Ed. 2d 564, 1985 U.S. LEXIS 4837 (U.S. 1985). It is not abuse of discretion to deny motion for sentence reduction despite demonstration of commendable behavior made to the district court. Montez v. State, 592 P.2d 1153, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 392 (Wyo. 1979). Defendant was not entitled to probation time credit when resentenced in probation revocation proceeding. — District court correctly concluded defendant was not entitled to credit for time he spent on probation when he was resentenced in a probation revocation proceeding because his time on probation and in treatment could not be considered presentence confinement as there was no indication that his probation, or his time in treatment or in Treatment Court as conditions of that probation, would subject him to a charge of escape from detention if he left either program. Stevenson v. State, 2023 WY 99, 537 P.3d 328, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 101 (Wyo. 2023). Failure to reduce sentence not abuse of discretion. — Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to accept the prosecution’s recommendation for a lesser sentence when it revoked the defendant’s probation and reimposed upon him the original sentence which was within the statutorily prescribed limits. Mower v. State, 750 P.2d 679, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 1988), reh’g denied, 1988 Wyo. LEXIS 50 (Wyo. Mar. 18, 1988). District court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion for sentence reduction because his claims of factual innocence were barred by res judicata, his Eighth Amendment claim could not be cured by a sentence reduction motion, many of defendant’s arguments had been raised and considered at sentencing, and the affidavits of defendant’s wife and mother-in-law supporting a sentence reduction did not constitute expert testimony as neither witness had the qualifications to give a legal or medical opinion. Leners v. State, 2022 WY 127, 518 P.3d 686, 2022 Wyo. LEXIS 127 (Wyo. 2022). Factors considered by court. — Trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for sentence reduction under Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35, as defendant’s behavior of remaining discipline-free, pursuing work and educational opportunities, and accepting responsibility for his actions did not alone provide a basis for reversal of the trial court’s decision. Harper v. State, 2023 WY 49, 529 P.3d 1071, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 48 (Wyo. 2023). District court not required to elaborate on reasons for denying motion. — In an action for possession and delivery of methamphetamine, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not elaborate on its reasons for denying defendant’s Wyo. R. Crim. P. 35(b), motion for sentence reduction because neither the Addicted Offender Accountability Act nor Rule 35(b) required the district court to explain that alternative treatments were considered. Hurtado v. State, 2023 WY 63, 531 P.3d 306, 2023 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 2023). Restitution order not illegal. — Order to pay $93,966 in restitution after pleading guilty to first and third degree arson was not illegal where evidence showed that the trial court properly advised defendant prior to acceptance of his guilty plea of his potential restitution obligation and where specific finding of defendant’s ability to pay was not required. Whitten v. State, 2005 WY 55, 110 P.3d 892, 2005 Wyo. LEXIS 63 (Wyo. 2005). Multiple motions within time period allowed. — This rule does not prohibit the filing and considering more than one motion if done within the 120-day (now one-year) limitation. Nelson v. State, 733 P.2d 1034, 1987 Wyo. LEXIS 410 (Wyo. 1987). Issues decided may not be relitigated. — Where the issue relating to the imposition of a second increased sentence was raised in defendant’s direct appeal from conviction and there considered and decided, the question is governed by the doctrine of the law of the case, and the availability of relief under this rule, as is true of all other post-conviction relief mechanisms, does not permit a defendant to revitalize and relitigate the issue. Montez v. State, 592 P.2d 1153, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 392 (Wyo. 1979). A motion to correct an illegal sentence does not permit a defendant to relitigate an issue which has already been considered and decided. Brown v. State, 894 P.2d 597, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1995). Any issues not previously decided are barred by § 7-14-103 or are not properly matters for consideration under a Rule 35(a) motion. Brown v. State, 894 P.2d 597, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 62 (Wyo. 1995). Motion to correct an illegal sentence is not available for an attack on the validity of a conviction. — A motion to correct an illegal sentence presupposes a valid conviction and may not be used to re-examine errors occurring at trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence; therefore, issues concerning the validity of a conviction will not be addressed in the context of a Rule 35 motion. Bird v. State, 2002 WY 14, 39 P.3d 430, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 14 (Wyo. 2002). Res judicata. — Issue of illegality of sentence could have been raised in defendant’s earlier appeal from order revoking his probation and sentencing him to incarceration, and therefore his subsequent motion for correction of illegal sentence was barred by doctrine of res judicata. Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564, 2000 Wyo. LEXIS 100 (Wyo. 2000). On direct appeal, defendant’s argument centered around defendant’s status as a habitual criminal, and its effect on defendant’s sentences, and although in defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, defendant’s argument differed slightly from that presented on direct appeal, the distinction was insufficient to avoid the application of res judicata; further, defendant offered no showing of why the issues raised in the current appeal could not have been raised in defendant’s direct appeal, and absent such a showing defendant’s claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 148, 79 P.3d 493, 2003 Wyo. LEXIS 179 (Wyo. 2003). Defendant raised his double jeopardy claim for the first time in his motion to correct an illegal sentence, but he could have raised his claim in a direct appeal and did not present any particulars in support of his good cause argument for not doing so; res judicata precludes review of his claim. Bernard v. State, 2025 WY 66, 570 P.3d 416, 2025 Wyo. LEXIS 66 (Wyo. 2025). Relief not available following guilty plea. — Relief under subdivision (a) of this rule was not available to defendant seeking to attack voluntariness of his guilty plea, and thus the validity of his conviction. Smith v. State, 969 P.2d 1136, 1998 Wyo. LEXIS 189 (Wyo. 1998). No abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony regarding mental condition. — A trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to provide expert testimony concerning his mental condition in sentence modification hearings; defendant failed to explain how expert testimony that might provide a different diagnosis could or should result in a reduction of his sentence. Barela v. State, 936 P.2d 66, 1997 Wyo. LEXIS 64 (Wyo. 1997). Hearing permitted during appeal preparation. — A trial judge is permitted to conduct a hearing under this rule while defendant is in the process of preparing an appeal. Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 482 (Wyo. 1979). This rule makes no provision for furnishing transcript to defendant preliminary to the application for reduction. Escobedo v. State, 601 P.2d 1028, 1979 Wyo. LEXIS 499 (Wyo. 1979). Proper to deny sentence reduction where no abuse of discretion in original sentence. — There was no abuse of discretion in the imposition of the original sentence of two-to-five years on each of two counts of third-degree sexual assault, to be served consecutively, upon a defendant who forced an 11-year-old victim to have sex with him over a period of years and who showed only situational remorse. Given this fact, and the fact that no error of law was committed, there was no justification for the appellate court to interfere with the trial court’s discretion in denying a motion to reduce sentence. Peterson v. State, 706 P.2d 276, 1985 Wyo. LEXIS 630 (Wyo. 1985). District court loses jurisdiction after time period. — A district court loses jurisdiction of a criminal case 120 days (now one year) following the date of the judgment and sentence and, thus, may not consider a motion to reduce a sentence filed after that time period. Stewart v. State, 654 P.2d 727, 1982 Wyo. LEXIS 420 (Wyo. 1982) (decided prior to 1987 amendment) . District court without jurisdiction to hear appeal. — Except where there has been a remand following an appeal in a criminal case, or where one of the statutes or rules, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-27-101 et seq., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7- 14-101 through 7-14-108, or W.R.Cr.P. 35, otherwise expressly permits a district court to continue to assert jurisdiction over that criminal case, no authority exists for the court to act in the case, and thus the district court was without jurisdiction to consider defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea where the motion was filed over five years after entry of his plea and over five years after his sentence was imposed. Barela v. State, 2002 WY 143, 55 P.3d 11, 2002 Wyo. LEXIS 168 (Wyo. 2002). Court may reduce sentence beyond time period. — The trial court had a “reasonable” amount of time to rule on a timely motion for sentence reduction, even if the motion had not been decided within 120 days (now one year) from the date of entry of the sentence. Arland v. State, 788 P.2d 1125, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 32 (Wyo. 1990). Double jeopardy remedy appropriate under § 7-14-101. — A motion under subsection (a) of this rule is not the proper remedy by which to assert a violation of double jeopardy protections. Upon exhaustion of the right to directly appeal from conviction, post-conviction relief provided through §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108 is the only proper method of gaining relief on a double jeopardy claim. Birr v. State, 878 P.2d 515, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 87 (Wyo. 1994). Claims alleging a violation of double jeopardy are not cognizable under the language of this rule. Instead, such challenges must be brought as a petition for post-conviction relief under §§ 7-14-101 and 7-14-108. Parker v. State, 882 P.2d 1225, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 122 (Wyo. 1994). Physical inability to complete program did not justify sentencing change. — Although defendant had entered a plea agreement which recommended him for the Wyoming Youthful Offender Program, his inability to participate in the program due to a physical impairment did not violate the doctrines of equal protection and separation of powers and did not entitle the district court to correct his sentence. The defendant’s plea was not induced by false promises and the error alleged did not fall within the narrow definition of illegal sentences; therefore, the warden’s refusal to accept him in the program because of his physical injury was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and was supportable. Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 1994 Wyo. LEXIS 120 (Wyo. 1994). Executive department actions beyond scope of section. — The manner in which the executive department of government is directing the service of defendant’s sentences cannot be addressed pursuant to a motion under this section. Apodaca v. State, 891 P.2d 83, 1995 Wyo. LEXIS 35 (Wyo. 1995). Because the Wyoming legislature has delegated the power to revoke parole to an executive agency and divested the courts of any such power, a prisoner whose parole has been revoked cannot challenge the Wyoming board of parole’s decision by filing a motion pursuant to this rule in Wyoming district court to correct an illegal sentence. Hamill v. Ferguson, 937 F. Supp. 1517, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17115 (D. Wyo. 1996).