[1] To the extent that time permits, and judicial independence and impartiality are not compromised, judges are encouraged to engage in appropriate extrajudicial activities. Judges are uniquely qualified to engage in extrajudicial activities that concern the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, such as by speaking, writing, teaching, or participating in scholarly research projects. In addition, judges are permitted and encouraged to engage in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic extrajudicial activities not conducted for profit, even when the activities do not involve the law. See Rule 3.7. [2] Participation in both law-related and other extrajudicial activities helps integrate judges into their communities, and furthers public understanding of and respect for courts and the judicial system. [3] Discriminatory actions and expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge’s official or judicial actions, are likely to appear to a reasonable person to call into question the judge’s integrity and impartiality. Examples include jokes or other remarks that demean individuals based upon their race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status. For the same reason, a judge’s extrajudicial activities must not be conducted in connection or affiliation with an organization that practices invidious discrimination. See Rule 3.6. [4] While engaged in permitted extrajudicial activities, judges must not coerce others or take action that would reasonably be perceived as coercive. For example, depending upon the circumstances, a judge’s solicitation of contributions or memberships for an organization, even as permitted by Rule 3.7(A), might create the risk that the person solicited would feel obligated to respond favorably, or would do so to curry favor with the judge. Allegation of friendship without more is insufficient to establish bias and partiality of a judge in a case (decided under prior code). Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982). Evidence insufficient to show bias. — Critical remarks by a justice in the dissent reversing the defendant’s first conviction did not impair that justice’s impartiality to hear the appeal of the second conviction as demonstrated by the justice’s careful consideration of and response to the defendant’s Motion for Disqualification (decided under prior code). Harvey v. Shillinger, 893 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Wyo. 1995), aff ’d, 76 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1996). Improper supervision of court staff. — Where a judge had not filed a petition pursuant to Rules Governing the Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics 24(a) (now Rule 27(a)) so that he consented to a determination on the merits of the record filed by the Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics, a circuit judge was publicly censured, his conduct by a failure to appropriately supervise and discipline members of his court staff, most notably his wife who was the chief clerk, breached the requirements of this provision (decided under prior code). In re Crow, 2007 WY 13, 151 P.3d 270, 2007 Wyo. LEXIS 15 (Wyo. 2007). Effect of judge as prosecutorial witness in subsequent proceeding. — The fact that a judge is later considered as a prosecutorial witness does not establish that, during the time he was the presiding judge, he had personal knowledge of any disputed evidentiary fact or violation of this canon (decided under prior code). Hopkinson v. State, 632 P.2d 79, 1981 Wyo. LEXIS 357 (Wyo. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463, 1982 U.S. LEXIS 698 (U.S. 1982). Ex-parte conference between judge and guardian unethical. — An ex-parte conference between the trial judge and the guardian ad litem appointed to represent the minor child of the parties could not be ethically justified, but did not require reversal of an adjudication of child custody in a divorce action where no prejudicial error was manifested (decided under prior code). Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261, 1991 Wyo. LEXIS 70 (Wyo. 1991). Reversal not required following quashed ex-parte communication. — A judge’s impropriety in reading an ex-parte communication from a deputy county sheriff just prior to the sentencing hearing did not automatically require reversal and remand for resentencing by another judge, where the court stated on the record that the letter was quashed and that he would not consider it in sentencing (decided under prior code). Coletti v. State, 769 P.2d 361, 1989 Wyo. LEXIS 43 (Wyo. 1989).
