Maine Restyling Note [November 2014]
Maine Rule of Evidence 701 is similar to its federal counterpart. Maine has not adopted the final subparagraph (c) of Federal Rule 701 and that omission is carried through in the restyled Rule.
Federal Restyling Committee Note
The language of Rule 701 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
The Committee deleted all reference to an “inference” on the grounds that the deletion made the Rule flow better and easier to read, and because any “inference” is covered by the broader term “opinion.” Courts have not made substantive decisions on the basis of any distinction between an opinion and an inference. No change in current practice is intended.
Advisers’ Note to former M.R. Evid. 701
(February 2, 1976)
This rule is declaratory of Maine law. Clause (a) is the familiar requirement of firsthand knowledge or observation. See, e.g., Wiles v. Connor Coal & Wood Co., 143 Me. 250, 60 A.2d 786 (1948) (estimate of speed inadmissible when no adequate opportunity to observe). Clause (b) limits testimony in the form of opinions or inferences to those helpful in resolving issues. Often the only way to convey what the witness observed is in the form of opinion or inference. Speed is an obvious example; identity is another. Courts admit such testimony out of necessity, often referring to it as a “short- hand rendering of facts.” Stacy v. Portland Publishing Co., 68 Me. 279, 285
(1878) . The opinion or inference of a witness is not “helpful” under this provision if relating what he observed would put the jury in the position to come to its own conclusion. Hence such an opinion would be rejected.
