Rule 602 Lack of personal knowledge; witness may not testify; evidence.
Rule Text
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of section 27-703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Amendment history: Laws 1975, LB 279, § 35.
Plain-English Summary (for reference only — not a substitute for the rule text above)
This summary is not the rule. The rule text controls.
If someone wants to testify about something in court, they have to actually know about it firsthand. They need to have seen it, heard it, or experienced it themselves. Courts won't let someone guess, assume, or repeat something they only heard from another person as if it were their own knowledge.
Before a witness can talk about a fact, there has to be enough proof showing they really do know about it. This proof can come from the witness's own words, like saying "I was there and I saw it happen," but it doesn't have to. Other evidence can show the witness had a chance to know the facts too.
There's one exception to this rule. Expert witnesses, like doctors or engineers, are allowed to give opinions based on their training and experience, even if they didn't personally witness the specific event in question. That part of the law is covered separately under the rule for expert testimony.
Committee Notes
1. Personal knowledge, generally
1. Personal knowledge, generally
2. Personal knowledge in specific cases
2. Personal knowledge in specific cases
1. Personal knowledge, generally
1. Personal knowledge, generally
Under this section and sections 27-701 and 27-702, it is improper for a witness to testify whether another person may or may not have been telling the truth in a specific instance. State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017).
Under this section and sections 27-701 and 27-702, it is improper for a witness to testify whether another person may or may not have been telling the truth in a specific instance. State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017).
Under this section, lay witnesses may testify only as to factual matters based upon their personal knowledge. State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017).
Under this section, lay witnesses may testify only as to factual matters based upon their personal knowledge. State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716, 890 N.W.2d 178 (2017).
A party's "assumption" of a fact confesses the absence of personal knowledge of the fact. Sulu v. Magana, 293 Neb. 148, 879 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
A party's "assumption" of a fact confesses the absence of personal knowledge of the fact. Sulu v. Magana, 293 Neb. 148, 879 N.W.2d 674 (2016).
A witness testifying to objective facts must have had means of knowing the facts from the witness' personal knowledge. State v. Kirksey, 254 Neb. 162, 575 N.W.2d 377 (1998).
A witness testifying to objective facts must have had means of knowing the facts from the witness' personal knowledge. State v. Kirksey, 254 Neb. 162, 575 N.W.2d 377 (1998).
Testimony concerning observations of conduct, behavior in terms of false perceptions, or mistaken ideas, is controlled by the personal knowledge provision of this section. State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 381 N.W.2d 120 (1986).
Testimony concerning observations of conduct, behavior in terms of false perceptions, or mistaken ideas, is controlled by the personal knowledge provision of this section. State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 381 N.W.2d 120 (1986).
2. Personal knowledge in specific cases
2. Personal knowledge in specific cases
Inadequate foundation for personal knowledge was cured on cross-examination when opposing counsel questioned witness regarding matter for own purposes beyond explaining or rebutting the original evidence. State v. Rieger, 260 Neb. 519, 618 N.W.2d 619 (2000).
Inadequate foundation for personal knowledge was cured on cross-examination when opposing counsel questioned witness regarding matter for own purposes beyond explaining or rebutting the original evidence. State v. Rieger, 260 Neb. 519, 618 N.W.2d 619 (2000).
It was not necessary for a police officer to remember the name of a person to whom he administered a photographic array in order to have personal knowledge of that person's photographic identification. State v. Rieger, 260 Neb. 519, 618 N.W.2d 619 (2000).
It was not necessary for a police officer to remember the name of a person to whom he administered a photographic array in order to have personal knowledge of that person's photographic identification. State v. Rieger, 260 Neb. 519, 618 N.W.2d 619 (2000).
In establishing foundation for test results, a witness may not testify as to whether laboratory protocols were followed unless the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, i.e., the witness performed the test or witnessed the test being performed. State v. Jackson, 255 Neb. 68, 582 N.W.2d 317 (1998).
In establishing foundation for test results, a witness may not testify as to whether laboratory protocols were followed unless the witness has personal knowledge of the matter, i.e., the witness performed the test or witnessed the test being performed. State v. Jackson, 255 Neb. 68, 582 N.W.2d 317 (1998).
A witness may not testify about the custody procedures used by a police department unless evidence is introduced to show that he or she has personal knowledge of the matter. State v. Smith, 238 Neb. 111, 469 N.W.2d 146 (1991).
A witness may not testify about the custody procedures used by a police department unless evidence is introduced to show that he or she has personal knowledge of the matter. State v. Smith, 238 Neb. 111, 469 N.W.2d 146 (1991).
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. The record supported a conclusion that the deponent did not possess or could not articulate personal knowledge. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986).
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. The record supported a conclusion that the deponent did not possess or could not articulate personal knowledge. State v. Irish, 223 Neb. 578, 391 N.W.2d 137 (1986).
A bystander who heard but did not see an automobile accident was a citizen informant and presumptively reliable in giving a tip to a police officer, which led to an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle for unlawfully leaving the scene of a property damage accident, where the bystander was present when the accident occurred, perceived the accident through his senses, saw the driver's failure to stop and leave information after the accident, and pointed to the vehicle that had just left the scene as the vehicle that was involved in the accident. State v. Flodman, 33 Neb. App. 504, 18 N.W.3d 599 (2025).
A bystander who heard but did not see an automobile accident was a citizen informant and presumptively reliable in giving a tip to a police officer, which led to an investigatory stop of the defendant's vehicle for unlawfully leaving the scene of a property damage accident, where the bystander was present when the accident occurred, perceived the accident through his senses, saw the driver's failure to stop and leave information after the accident, and pointed to the vehicle that had just left the scene as the vehicle that was involved in the accident. State v. Flodman, 33 Neb. App. 504, 18 N.W.3d 599 (2025).
View Statute 27-601
Chapter 27 Index
View Statute27-603