Committee commentary. — Modeled in part on Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5-801 NMRA permits a district court to correct a sentence for clear error and to consider a reduction of sentence on motion of the defendant. As with Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it permits alteration of a sentence that “resulted from arithmetical, [or] technical” error. Rule 5-113(B) NMRA accounts for corrections of “clerical” errors.
This rule, as with the modern iteration of Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, dispenses with the common law principle that a district court retains inherent and unlimited jurisdiction to correct illegal sentences at any time. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory comm. notes (1991) (recognizing that Fed. R. Crim P. 35 aligns with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which repealed the district court’s indefinite jurisdiction to correct a sentence). The length of time in which a district court retains jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence for clear error is restricted to thirty (30) days, consistent with the time for appealing sentences. See State v. Romero, 2023-NMSC-008, ¶ 29 n.4, 528 P.3d 640. This limit “reduce[s] the likelihood of jurisdictional questions in the event of an appeal and to provide the parties with an opportunity to address the court’s correction of the sentence, or lack thereof, in any appeal of the sentence.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory comm. notes (1991)).
As the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are shorter than the time limits for a motion to reduce sentence, a motion to reduce sentence will only serve to toll those limits if filed within the time for filing the notice of appeal. See Rule 12-201(D)(1)(b) NMRA; see also State v. Romero, 2014-NMCA-063, ¶¶ 5-13, 327 P.3d 525 (concluding that timely filing of post-judgment motion under Rule 5-801 suspends finality of judgment until a written ruling on the motion is entered under Rule 5-121 NMRA). In the previous iteration of this rule, this was solely stated in the commentary. However, the Committee believes that this fundamentally important issue should be stated in the rule, and it is now placed in Paragraph C.
Post-appeal, motions to reduce sentence must be filed within ninety (90) days. The trial court may reduce the sentence within a “reasonable time” after the filing of the motion. Romero, 2014-NMCA-063, ¶ 8. The Supreme Court has suggested that ninety (90) days from a timely filed motion constitutes a “reasonable time.” See Hayes v. State, 1988-NMSC-021, 106 N.M. 806, 751 P.2d 186; see also Rule 5-121 (encouraging prompt orders and requiring the court to “enter the judgment and order within a reasonable time after submission.”)
The authority to correct a sentence under Paragraph A of this rule is intended to be very narrow and to extend only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake has occurred in the sentence; that is, the error must be of the sort that, if appealed, would almost certainly result in a remand of the case to the trial court for correction of an illegal sentence under the rule. Paragraph A of this rule is not an opportunity for the court to reconsider the application or interpretation of sentencing statutes or for the court simply to change its mind about the appropriateness of the sentence. Nor should it be used to reopen issues previously resolved at the sentencing hearing. The Committee did not intend that the rule relax any requirement that the parties state all objections to a sentence at or before the sentencing hearing. Motions challenging the legal validity of a conviction or a sentence should be brought under Rules 5-802 or 5-803 NMRA.
This rule requires a district court to hold a hearing to correct an illegal sentence only when “the corrected sentence results in more onerous sentencing terms.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 advisory comm. notes (1991) (recognizing that a court may correct an illegal sentence sua sponte); State v. Sommer, 1994-NMCA-070, ¶ 8, 118 N.M. 58, 878 P.2d 1007. The defendant must be present at the hearing. See Sommer, 1994-NMCA-070, ¶ 8 (holding that “a defendant need not be present at a hearing to reconsider a sentence, except where the hearing results in the terms of the sentence being made more onerous”).
