Subdivision (a)(1) incorporates the holding of Stellar Construction Inc. v. Sborz, 748 A.2d 667 (Pa. 2000) with respect to the date upon which the appeal period begins to run.
Historical Commentary
The following commentary is historical in nature and represents statements of the Committee at the time of rulemaking:
Explanatory Comment—1981
The form of appeal is simplified by the Rules. A simple notice of appeal substantially in the form prescribed by Appellate Rule 904 is all that is now required. The form appears in Rule 1313. The archaic oath or affirmation that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay but because the affiant firmly believes injustice has been done was abolished by Rule 247.1, effective February 2, 1980, and is not included in the form. Subdivision (c) abolishes the historic practice, mandated by Section 27 of the Act of 1836, of requiring the appellant to pay the costs accrued and to file a bond for further costs to accrue. Failure to pay the costs in full and post the bond as required by Sections 27 and 30 of the Act of 1836 and the Act of March 20, 1845, P.L. 188, 42 P.S. § 921, have been the subject of continual litigation and often resulted in quashing of the appeal.
In Oakley, Inc. v. School District of Philadelphia, 464 Pa. 330, 346 A.2d 765 (1975), the Supreme Court reversed previous decisions of the Superior Court holding that the statutory requirement of payment of costs was discretionary and not mandatory. Oakley held that the statutory requirements for the perfecting of an appeal are jurisdictional and mandatory, unless fraud or some breakdown in the court’s operation causes the failure to comply with the statutory requirements. It therefore remanded to permit the lower court to determine whether the prothonotary’s docket notation of the costs had been so confusing and misleading that it led to a $10 underpayment.
There were many decisions on the effect of defects in the bond on the validity of the appeal.
The abolition of payment of accrued costs and the filing of bond will relieve the courts of much litigation without substantial impairment of the rights of litigants. The amount of accrued costs is in most cases not significant and if a monetary award is made and the losing party owns real estate, the award will constitute a lien continuing during pendency of appeal. The abolition of these prerequisites should not substantially increase the number of appeals.
The effect of this will be that payment of the compensation of the arbitrators will be the only financial burden on the appeal, other than the filing fee, if any, which may be established by legislation or general rule. The provision of subdivision (a)(2) as to repayment of arbitrators’ fees follows prior practice without change.
The thirty-day period for appeal prescribed by subdivision (a)(1) follows the directive of Rule 247.1 and Sections 7361(d) and 5571 of the Judicial Code. Rule 247.1 is no longer needed and is rescinded.
Subdivision (a) also contains a concluding clause confirming the power of the court to permit the appellant to proceed in forma pauperis, namely, without prepaying the compensation of the arbitrators or paying the filing fee, if any.
Subdivision (b) changes prior practice under existing local rules which require the appellant to serve a copy of the appeal on all other parties to the action. It requires the prothonotary to give the notice, which the appellant must furnish him, postage prepaid.
Subdivision (b) settles the problem of whether failure of an appellant to give notice of the appeal required by a local rule warrants the dismissal of the appeal with prejudice. Mikita v. Bailey Homes, Inc., 265 Pa.Super. 399, 401 A.2d 1367 (1979), upheld the power of a local court to promulgate such a rule. Subdivision (a)(3) now prescribes that failure to give the notice shall not invalidate the appeal. Local rules to the contrary are no longer applicable.
In addition to the right of appeal de novo, Section 26 of the Act of 1836, 5 P.S. § 57, provided for setting aside an award if the arbitrators misbehaved or the award was obtained by corruption or other undue means. The Act did not place any time limit on the filing of the petition, but many local rules which incorporated Section 26 of the Act of 1836 provided the same time limit as the time for appeal. This raised problems if both an appeal and a petition to set aside the award were filed within the time for appeal. In Township of Hampden, Cumberland County v. Tenny, 32 Pa.Cmwlth. 301, 379 A.2d 635 (1977), the court held that dismissal of the petition to set aside the award was interlocutory and in effect was made moot by the appeal for trial de novo.
The Rules do not continue the practice of petitioning to set aside an award for corruption or misbehavior. Hearings or depositions on the petition proceedings could delay the proceedings. Rule 1311(b) creates quasi-judicial immunity for the arbitrators with respect to their official actions and they cannot be called to testify. As a practical matter, if the fraud or corruption were proved, remand and the appointment of a new panel could be the only relief. Trial de novo is preferable since it expedites the proceedings. The court would, of course, have power to punish the attorney-arbitrators involved for any professional misconduct that could be proved.
Explanatory Comment—2000
Rule 1308 governing compulsory arbitration has been amended in two respects. First, subdivision (a)(1) governs the filing of a notice of appeal from an award of arbitrators and previously provided that the notice of appeal must be filed not later than thirty days ‘‘after the entry of the award on the docket’’. That provision has now been revised to incorporate the holding of Stellar Construction, Inc. v. Ronald Sborz et al, individually and trading as Keystone Meats, 748 A.2d 667, 669 (Pa. 2000):
In furtherance of clarity, certainty and ease of determination, see Frazier, 557 Pa. at 621-22, 735 A.2d at 115, we hold that the date of entry of an order for purposes of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1308 shall mean the day on which the prothonotary fulfills its duty to make the required notation on the docket reflecting that notice of entry of the arbitration award has been provided as required by Rule 1307(a)(3).
Second, the note following subdivision (c) of the rule has been deleted as obsolete.
