Rule 303 Presumptions in Criminal Cases

Maine Restyling Note [November 2014]

The Federal Rules of Evidence do not deal with presumptions in the context of criminal cases. The Maine Rule has been restyled in accordance with the federal restyling format.

Advisers’ Note to former M.R. Evid. 303

(February 2, 1976)

Subdivision (a) makes it clear that Maine statutes using the phrase “prima facie evidence” or “prima facie proof” will be regarded as creating presumptions within the meaning of this rule.

Subdivision (b) recognizes that presumptions in criminal prosecutions pose problems not involved in civil cases. Since a verdict of guilty can never be directed, it follows that the court cannot direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused as to any element of the offense. The use of a presumption cannot take away from the jury any evidentiary issue, and the court can submit the existence of the presumed fact to the jury only if the jury could find guilt or the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence as a whole. This substantially reflects Maine law. State v. O’Clair, 256 A.2d 839 (Me. 1969).

Subdivision (c) incorporates the recommendation of the Law Court in State v. Poulin, 277 A.2d 493 (Me. 1971), that the trial judge should avoid charging the jury in terms of a presumption, which was thought to be confusing. It refers instead to the right to draw reasonable inferences from facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but makes it clear that the jurors are not required to accept the presumed fact. In other words, the presumption cannot be made conclusive.30