Maine Restyling Note [November 2014]
Maine Rule 401 and Federal Rule 401 are substantively identical, and therefore the Advisory Committee recommends adoption of the language of the restyled Federal Rule. The restyled Rule breaks out the concepts of classical relevance and materiality in two subsections.
Federal Advisory Committee Note
The language of Rule 401 has been amended as part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
30 The current state of the law regarding use of presumptions or inferences in criminal cases is addressed in Alexander, Maine Jury Instruction Manual, § 6-13 at 6-23 (2014 ed.).
Advisers’ Note to former M.R. Evid. 401
(February 2, 1976)
This rule states traditional Maine law. See, e.g., Perlin v. Rosen, 131 Me. 481, 483, 164 A. 625, 626 (1933). The rule does not define relevancy in terms of materiality. Relevant evidence is defined as meaning evidence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. Materiality looks to the relation between the proposition for which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the proposition is not probative of a matter in issue, it is immaterial. If the proposition is material, evidence which makes it more probable than it would be without the evidence is relevant evidence. Nothing would be gained by including in the rule any reference to materiality. The Supreme Court promulgated the rule in this form and the Advisory Committee Note said that the language “has the advantage of avoiding the loosely used word `material.’”
